Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

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Two pilots, Luis F. Bonnet and Carlos R. Benítez Maldonado, were employed by Benítez Aviation, Inc. (BAI), which managed a Cessna aircraft. In April and May 2019, Bonnet and Benítez piloted several flights without the required certificates for commercial operations. The FAA suspended their Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificates for 270 days, alleging they operated the flights as air carriers or commercial operators without proper certification. The pilots received their regular salaries but no additional compensation for these flights.The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action, which the pilots appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the FAA's suspension order, finding that the flights were conducted for compensation and hire, thus requiring compliance with Part 135 regulations. The NTSB affirmed the ALJ's decision, concluding that the flights were subject to air carrier or commercial operator requirements and that the pilots violated multiple FAA regulations. The NTSB also found that the ALJ did not exhibit bias and that the 270-day suspension was appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NTSB's findings that the flights were operated as common carriers for compensation, thus requiring Part 135 certification. The court also found that the pilots were responsible for ensuring compliance with FAA regulations, regardless of BAI's role in booking the flights. The court upheld the NTSB's decision, including the 270-day suspension of the pilots' certificates, finding it justified based on the pilots' regulatory violations and the potential risk to passenger safety. The petition for review was denied. View "Bonnet v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

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Susan Hardy, a resident of Louisiana, flew from Newark, New Jersey, to Oslo, Norway, on Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). Upon disembarking in Oslo, she fell and fractured her leg. Hardy sued SAS in the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention provided both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over SAS. The district court dismissed her case, ruling that the Montreal Convention only granted subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that SAS’s waiver of service did not establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Hardy’s complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention did not create personal jurisdiction over SAS. It also rejected Hardy’s argument that SAS’s waiver of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) established personal jurisdiction, reasoning that SAS did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to warrant such jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention does not independently create personal jurisdiction over a defendant airline, as it only prescribes venue. However, the court found that the district court erred in its analysis under Rule 4(k)(2). The correct analysis should have considered SAS’s contacts with the United States as a whole, not just Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit concluded that SAS had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline System" on Justia Law

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Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Yanjun Xu" on Justia Law

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The case involves the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610, a Boeing 737 MAX, which took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, and crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018, killing all on board. The plaintiffs are family members and representatives of the estates of two passengers, Liu Chandra and Andrea Manfredi. They filed lawsuits against Boeing and other defendants, seeking damages under various legal theories, including the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), state law, and other federal statutes.The Chandra case was initially filed in Illinois state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Manfredi case was filed directly in the same federal court. Both sets of plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and asserted claims under DOHSA, state law, and other federal statutes. Boeing filed motions to limit the plaintiffs' claims to DOHSA and to preclude a jury trial. The district court ruled in favor of Boeing, holding that DOHSA was the exclusive remedy and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The court dismissed all non-DOHSA claims and certified the jury trial issue for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, holding that DOHSA preempts all other claims and mandates a bench trial. The court reasoned that DOHSA's language and legislative history indicate that claims under the statute must be brought in admiralty, which does not carry the right to a jury trial. The court also noted that Congress has not amended DOHSA to allow for jury trials in federal court, despite longstanding judicial interpretations to the contrary. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims must proceed without a jury. The court's decision was to affirm the district court's rulings. View "Buehler v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, We CBD, LLC, and We C Manage, LLC, sought to transport hemp by air from Oregon to Switzerland in October 2020. They engaged Ed Clark, a charter broker, who then contacted Planet Nine Private Air, LLC, to arrange the transport. Planet Nine was informed that the cargo was legal hemp. The flight was scheduled to depart on November 8, 2020, but upon landing for refueling in Charlotte, North Carolina, U.S. Customs officials detained the plane and seized the cargo, suspecting it to be illegal marijuana. Subsequent tests confirmed high THC levels, leading to the destruction of the cargo.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina, alleging state law claims against Planet Nine for the destruction of their cargo. Planet Nine moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing air transport. The district court agreed, ruling that the Montreal Convention preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims because the events causing the damage occurred during the carriage by air.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' claims were indeed preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court reasoned that the critical events, including the plane's detention and the cargo's seizure and testing, occurred during the carriage by air. The court also noted that the public authority defense under the Montreal Convention applied, as the destruction of the cargo was carried out by U.S. Customs in connection with its transit. Thus, the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted, and the summary judgment in favor of Planet Nine was affirmed. View "We CBD, LLC v. Planet Nine Private Air, LLC" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, five Muslim U.S. citizens, allege they have been placed on the Terrorist Screening Dataset, commonly known as the "terrorist watchlist." This list includes the No-Fly List, which prevents individuals from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, which subjects individuals to enhanced security screening. Four plaintiffs claim they are on the Selectee List due to repeated enhanced screenings, while one plaintiff, Adis Kovac, claims he is on both the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Each plaintiff sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), but only Kovac received confirmation of his No-Fly List status.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against various federal agency heads, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed several claims, including due process and equal protection claims, and later dismissed Kovac’s No-Fly List claims as moot after he was removed from the list. The remaining APA claims were addressed at summary judgment, where the district court ruled that the agencies had statutory authority to maintain the watchlist and that the TRIP procedures were not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the relevant federal agencies have clear statutory authority to create, maintain, and use the watchlist for screening airline passengers. The court found that the statutory framework, including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, and subsequent legislation, provided unambiguous authority for the watchlist. The court did not address whether the major questions doctrine applied, as the statutory authority was clear. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the watchlist’s use in contexts unrelated to airport security. View "Kovac v. Wray" on Justia Law

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The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer's motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer's arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer's claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review. View "Palmer v. FAA" on Justia Law

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A pilot, who was injured in an airplane crash in 1985, sought medical benefits for a 2016 spinal surgery and subsequent treatment, as well as for diabetes treatment related to his spinal treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, concluding that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot’s spinal problems. The Board also excluded the testimony of the pilot’s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision and that the Board had not abused its discretion in its procedural rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot's spinal problems. The court also found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the pilot's biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The court further held that the Board did not have an obligation to secure the testimony of a particular witness, and that the pilot's failure to secure a witness's testimony did not create an obligation for the Board to do so. View "Jespersen v. Tri-City Air and Alaska Insurance Guaranty Company" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Antonio Santonastaso, was convicted of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The charges stemmed from a 2018 investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) into allegations that Santonastaso was flying a helicopter without the necessary certifications. During the investigation, Santonastaso falsely claimed that he had the requisite certifications to fly and that his previous involvement in a 2000 helicopter theft was part of an undercover operation.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where Santonastaso was found guilty. He appealed the decision, arguing that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt and that the district court erred by not giving a materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The court also ruled that the district court did not commit instructional error in rejecting Santonastaso's proposed materiality instruction. The court held that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine foreclosed the application of the Maslenjak materiality standard to § 1001(a) prosecutions, and that the district court's instruction correctly stated the controlling law on materiality. View "United States v. Santonastaso" on Justia Law

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The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes's pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year's imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.Fejes appealed the FAA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ's decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)'s reach.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes's petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming the FAA's revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes's argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes's conduct. The court also rejected Fejes's argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA's revocation of Fejes's pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "FEJES V. FAA" on Justia Law