Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

In 2002 an uncontrolled, runaway commercial aircraft at Las Vegas’s McCarran International Airport came to a rest at the bottom of an embankment. A maintenance worked had failed to properly engage the parking brake. The resulting property damage and loss-of-use of the aircraft totaled more than $10 million. The aircraft’s owner, Northwest Airlines, obtained a default judgment in Minnesota state court against PALS, the maintenance company responsible for the wreck, then commenced a garnishment action to recover part of the amount from PALS’s insurer, Westchester, which argued that PALS’s failure to provide notice and to cooperate extinguished Westchester’s payment obligation. While acknowledging unanswered questions of state law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Northwest. A Clark County ordinance mandates hangar-keepers liability insurance to protect parties like Northwest. Given this purpose, insurance coverage could not be avoided for an insured’s simple failure to satisfy the technical post-loss conditions on statutorily mandated coverage. View "NW Airlines, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After the court affirmed the ALJ's determination that Ameristar was liable for discharging Thomas Clemmons in violation of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, the court remanded for the determination of whether an e-mail found by Ameristar after Clemmons was fired was of such severity that he would have been terminated on those grounds alone. The ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to meet the high burden of proof required in AIR21 cases and the ARB affirmed. The court held that the heightened burden applies equally in all instances in which an employer is seeking to avoid providing relief, regardless of whether the employer is relying on pre-termination evidence or after-acquired evidence. In this case, the ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to provide clear and convincing proof that it would have terminated Clemmons solely on the basis of the e-mail. The ALJ had completely discredited the testimony of Ameristar's managers, and Ameristar offered no evidence other than the e-mail. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Ameristar failed to prove its after-acquired-evidence defense by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the court denied Ameristar's petition for review. View "Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2011, SecurityPoint filed suit against TSA for infringement of a patent covering some equipment and methods used in the Bin Advertising Program. In 2012, TSA modified the Program, amending the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) template to require participating airports to indemnify TSA from all liability for intellectual property claims related to the checkpoint equipment. TSA also changed the template to provide that, on cancellation of an agreement between an airport and a private company, TSA would retain the right to use the checkpoint equipment as well as a license to all intellectual property necessary for such use. SecurityPoint opposed the changes and wrote a cease and desist letter to TSA's Chief Counsel. SecurityPoint then petitioned for review of TSA's changes. The court held that TSA's chief counsel's letter rejecting SecurityPoint's request is a reviewable order and the court has jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a); on the merits, the court concluded that the letter failed to provide any basis upon which the court could conclude that it was the product of reasoned decisionmaking; nor is there anything in the record beyond counsel's letter that would support TSA's decision; and because TSA failed to consider an important aspect of the problem before it, its decision must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Security Point Holdings, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable. View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that Spirit conducted an enterprise by means of racketeering activity. The district court dismissed the action. The court concluded that, because federal laws do not preempt other federal laws, subsequent legislation could preclude plaintiffs' claims only if Congress had repealed the provision of RICO, at least insofar as they authorized plaintiffs' actions; Congress did not do so expressly through the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; there was no "repeal by implication" because Congress has not exhibited the requisite clear and manifest intent; and a saving clause found in the ADA did not disturb any other remedies provided by law. The court concluded that the two laws are not irreconcilably in conflict, nor was the ADA clearly intended as a substitute for RICO. The court, applying the strong presumption against implied repeals, was strongly constrained to conclude that RICO supplements, rather than subverts, federal regulation of air carriers. The court also held that the federal regulatory scheme governing the airline industry does not preclude a claim founded on the civil provisions of RICO. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Ray, et al. v. Spirit Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, motor carriers, alleging that defendants routinely violate California's meal and rest break laws, Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512; Cal. Code Regs. tit.8, 11090. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. The court concluded that the Act does not preempt California's meal and rest break laws as applied to defendants because those laws are not related to defendants' prices, routes, or services. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Air Jamaica and Caribbean Airlines, seeking recovery under Article 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350, a multilateral treaty setting rules for international air travel. Article 17 addresses accidents that injure passengers on board a plane or during the course of embarkation or disembarkation, and Article 19 concerns damages due to delay. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that Article 33 granted the district court power to hear plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on alternative grounds to the extent that plaintiff failed to state claims against defendants. The court vacated the dismissal of the Article 19 claim against Air Jamaica for damages from the $150 fee to change flights, and remanded only as to that issue. View "Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the FAA's revocation of his Designated Pilot Examiner appointment based on deficiencies in his performance. Petitioner argued that the FAA failed to follow its own procedures and that one of his FAA evaluators labored under a conflict of interest. The court concluded that plaintiff's termination letter substantially complied with an FAA order and, moreover, plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged deficiencies in the specificity of his termination letter. Further, plaintiff failed to show that any improper conflict of interest affected the decision to terminate his appointment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sheble, III v. Huerta, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated petitions concerned proposed alternatives to security procedures mandated by the TSA. Amerijet requested alternative cargo screening procedures at various foreign airports it services and the TSA largely denied these requests. Amerijet petitioned for review, arguing that TSA's denials failed for want of reasoned decisionmaking and that TSA's actions violated Amerijet's right to equal protection of the law. The court concluded that, even under a highly deferential standard of review, TSA's denials were arbitrary and capricious as to most of Amerijet's requests where TSA failed to adequately explain most of its denials. Because the court had no meaningful basis to evaluate TSA's decisionmaking, the court remanded, excluding two issues. Accordingly, Amerijet's equal protection claim is unripe and the court dismissed the claim without prejudice. View "Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Pistole" on Justia Law