Justia Aviation Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Civil Rights
Yates v. City of Chicago
From 1993-2017, Chicago treated O’Hare Airport aviation security officers as law-enforcement personnel, able to make arrests while employed and carry concealed firearms after retirement. The officers were unarmed and reported to the Commissioner of Aviation rather than the Chief of Police. In 2017 Chicago concluded that they are not law enforcement personnel. The Illinois Labor Relations Board sustained the decision. Neither the union nor any of its members contested that decision in state court. Three aviation security officers filed a federal suit, contending that the reclassification violated the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There is no “fundamental right” to be a law enforcement officer. Although the Chicago Code says that the officers “shall be sworn in as special policemen,” the process due for any violation of state or local law or of a collective-bargaining agreement is the opportunity to sue in state court. The union bypassed that opportunity in 2018. A suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not a way to supersede that decision. The collective-bargaining agreement does not promise that aviation security officers will remain law enforcement officials and the correct entity to seek review was the union, not individual members. The court upheld a $40,0000 award of costs. View "Yates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law
Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al.
As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al." on Justia Law
Silbaugh v. Chao
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that the FAA wrongfully terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff filed her action in the district court within the 30-day statutory limitations period, but she mistakenly named only the FAA and her former supervisor as defendants. Because plaintiff's action alleged claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, she should have named the head of the executive agency to which the FAA belonged, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao. After the statute of limitations had expired, the FAA moved to dismiss and Secretary Chao then filed her own motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). The panel held that the district court adopted an overly technical interpretation of the term "process" as used in Rule 15(c)(2). Rather, the panel held that the notice-giving function of "process" under Rule 15(c)(2) was accomplished whether or not the summons accompanying the complaint was signed by the clerk of court. Furthermore, the requirements for relation back were met here where both the United States Attorney and the Attorney General were sufficiently notified of the action within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)'s 90-day period. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Silbaugh v. Chao" on Justia Law
Kashem v. Barr
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging both their inclusion on the No Fly List and the sufficiency of the procedures available for contesting their inclusion on the list. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government and held that the district court properly rejected plaintiffs' as-applied vagueness challenges. The panel held that the No Fly List criteria are not impermissibly vague merely because they require a prediction of future criminal conduct or because they do not delineate what factors are relevant to that determination. Rather, the criteria are reasonably clear in their application to the specific conduct alleged in this case, which includes, for one or more plaintiffs, associating with and financing terrorists, training with militant groups overseas, and advocating terrorist violence.The panel weighed the Mathews v. Eldridge factors and held that the procedures provided to the plaintiffs were constitutionally sufficient and any error was nonprejudicial. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' substantive due process claims for lack of jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), which places review of TSA orders in the courts of appeals rather than the district court. View "Kashem v. Barr" on Justia Law
Corbett v. Transportation Security Administration
Petitioner brought a third challenge to the TSA's airport scanner equipment using advanced imaging technology (AIT). Petitioner challenged the TSA's latest policies and orders that require certain airline passengers to pass through AIT scanners, eliminating for them the option of being screened by a physical pat-down.The Eleventh Circuit held that it was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's claims, because petitioner lacked the necessary standing to bring the petition. The court held that petitioner failed to establish that he suffered an injury in fact, that is, the invasion of a judicially cognizable interest that is concrete and particularized and actual and imminent. In this case, petitioner has never said that he was subjected to the mandatory TSA policy, before his petition or since then, even though he has made numerous filings since he lodged his petition for review containing substantial information about his travel patterns and his interactions with TSA. View "Corbett v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law
Stokes v. Southwest Airlines
Private persons cannot sue in federal district court to enforce the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 41705. Although the Fifth Circuit determined that private persons could sue in federal district court to enforce the ACAA in Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991), the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–91 (2001), mandated a different result. In light of Sandoval, the court joined the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and held that the ACAA was enforceable only by the agency charged with administering it because no private right of action exists to enforce the ACAA in district court. View "Stokes v. Southwest Airlines" on Justia Law
Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. United States
The Federation filed a class action against United, alleging that the airline’s policy of using automatic kiosks inaccessible to blind travelers violates California’s antidiscrimination laws. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Federation’s claims were expressly preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 41713, and impliedly field preempted under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 41705, and its implementing regulations, issued by the DOT. Under its interpretation of section 41713(b)(1) of the ADA, the court concluded that the Federation’s claims do not relate to a “service” provided by United. Moreover, the court's conclusion that United's kiosks fall outside the statutory definition of “services” is consistent with the ADA’s deregulatory purpose. Therefore, the Federation’s claims are not expressly preempted under the ADA. Absent any specific indication that Congress sought to preserve all state-law claims not expressly preempted under the ADA, the court adopted the Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. approach and applied ordinary implied field preemption principles to the Federation’s claims. Applying the court's precedent concerning field preemption, the court concluded that the DOT ACAA regulations covering matters other than the use of airline ticketing kiosks are not pertinent to the court's field preemption inquiry; the new regulation is pervasive and intended to occupy the field of kiosk accessibility; and DOT acted within its delegated authority in promulgating the new regulation. Therefore, the Federation’s state-law claims are impliedly field preempted under the ACAA. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Nat'l Fed. of the Blind v. United States" on Justia Law
Emory v. United Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiffs in Adams v. United States challenged the nonretroactivity and protection-for-compliance provisions of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007 (FTEPA), Pub. L. No. 110-135, 121 Stat. 1450, as well as the FAA's implementation of these provisions. These provisions repealed the "Age 60 Rule" and extended the maximum age for piloting commercial flights by five years. Plaintiffs in Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., supplemented their constitutional objections with state and federal claims against their employer, United, and their union, ALPA, for advancing allegedly discriminatory interpretations of the nonretroactivity provision they knew to be incorrect. The court concluded that the FTEPA passed constitutional muster and should be interpreted as the Emory defendants have done. Therefore, the court affirmed the district courts' judgments as to all claims not dismissed as moot. View "Emory v. United Airlines, Inc. " on Justia Law
Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Plaintiff, who has difficulty walking because of certain health problems, alleged that United did not provide her with adequate assistance moving through the airport on two airplane trips and that she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result. The court held that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq., and its implementing regulations preempted state and territorial standards of care with respect to the circumstances which airlines must provide assistance to passengers with disabilities in moving through the airport. The ACAA did not, however, preempt any state remedies that could be available when airlines violated those standards. The court also held that the ACAA and its implementing regulations did not preempt state-law personal injury claims involving how airline agents interact with passengers with disabilities who requested assistance in moving through the airport. Finally, the court held that a terminal used for transportation by aircraft was excluded from definition as a Title III-covered place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12181 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law
Tobey v. Jones
Plaintiff sued the Richmond International Airport and TSA agents, alleging violations of his constitutional rights when he was seized and arrested for displaying the text of the Fourth Amendment on his chest. The district court denied the TSA agents' motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim and the TSA agents appealed. Because the court found that the facts as alleged by plaintiff plausibly set forth a claim that the TSA agents violated his clearly established First Amendment rights, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Tobey v. Jones" on Justia Law