Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Cope was convicted of one count of operating a common carrier (commercial airplane) under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction based on improper venue, insufficiency of the evidence, and improper reliance on federal regulations. In 2009, Defendant was the copilot and first officer of a commercial flight from Austin, Texas to Denver, Colorado. Robert Obodzinski was the captain. Following the flight to Austin, Mr. Obodzinski invited the crew to dinner, but Defendant declined, stating that he did not feel well. Mr. Obodzinski did not see Defendant again until the next morning in the hotel lobby. Mr. Obodzinski testified that “[Mr. Cope] had a little bit of a puffy face, and his eyes were a little red, and I assumed that since he said the night before he wasn’t feeling well, that he was probably coming down with a cold.” The pilots flew from Austin to Denver that morning without incident. While in the cockpit, Mr. Obodzinski detected occasional hints of the smell of alcohol. When they arrived in Denver, Mr. Obodzinski leaned over Defendant and “took a big whiff,” concluding that the smell of alcohol was coming from Defendant Mr. Obodzinski contacted dispatch to delay the next leg of their flight, and contacted the airline's human resources officer. Defendant would later be indicted by the federal grand jury in Colorado. After a two-day bench trial, the district court convicted Mr. Cope and sentenced him to a below-guidelines sentence of six months in prison and two years of supervised release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had sufficient evidence to find that Defendant was “under the influence of alcohol,” even if the district court relied on the FAA regulations or Republic Airways'[Defendant's employer] company policy, such reliance would have been harmless error. View "United States v. Cope" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from the denial of attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). After commencing an administrative civil penalties proceeding, the FAA withdrew its complaint and the ALJ before whom the complaint had been pending dismissed the proceedings with prejudice. Nonetheless, the FAA Administrator ruled that the subject of the complaint was not a "prevailing party" as that term had been interpreted in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res. Because the dismissal with prejudice had res judicata effect and ended the proceedings, the court granted the petition and remanded the case to the Administrator to determine whether the filing of the complaint was substantially justified, and if not, to award fees. View "Green Aviation Mgmt Co., LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

This case arose from the FAA's decision to suspend the airworthiness certification of a helicopter leased by plaintiff for his flight instruction business. Plaintiff brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq., alleging that he suffered financial harm as a result of the FAA's negligence in first issuing an airworthiness certificate to the helicopter. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that the FAA inspector's original certification of the aircraft fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. In view of the fact that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of plaintiff's action, the court need not reach the government's contention that the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA applied as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Holbrook v. United States" on Justia Law

American Airlines (American) petitioned for review of the TSA's denial of a request for reimbursement of American's expenditures on an "in-line" baggage-screening system in its new terminal at JFK International Airport. American argued that the TSA failed to comply with Congress's requirements for the agency's reimbursement determinations. Because the TSA either failed to base its reimbursement decision on the prioritization list mandated in 49 U.S.C. 44923 or failed to create a suitable prioritization list in the first place, the court granted American's petition and remanded to the TSA for further proceedings. View "American Airlines, Inc. v. TSA, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the NTSB's order affirming emergency revocation of his airman and medical certificates, which was based on the conclusion that he made an intentionally false statement on his medical certificate application when he failed to disclose an arrest for an alcohol-related motor vehicle accident. Petitioner contended that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to prove intent because he had reported the arrest and suspension to the FAA almost two years earlier and hence lacked any motive to falsify his answer on the application. The NTSB ruled that petitioner's admitted failure to read the question before answering it constituted willful disregard for truth or falsity, and he thus had intentionally made a false statement in his application. The court held that because the willful disregard standard articulated in Administrator v. Boardman, and endorsed by the FAA was a reasonable interpretation of the regulation, the NTSB's deference to the FAA's interpretation of its regulation was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cooper v. NTSB, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for a first-class airman medical certificate pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44703 and, after a period of evaluation, a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Federal Air Surgeon issued a denial based on the conclusion that petitioner did not meet the medical standards set out in the relevant regulations. At issue was whether the National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") affirmance of the denial of petitioner's medical certificate was supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the NTSB's decision and held that the petition for review was denied where there was no doubt that the FAA's submissions provided substantial evidence for the denial and where petitioner failed to show that it was unreasonable for the NTSB to credit the FAA's evidence over his own.View "Newton Dickson v. NTSB, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FAA's issuance of 130 Determinations of No Hazard for each of the proposed wind turbines in the area of Nantucket Sound. Petitioners argued that the FAA violated its governing statute, misread its own regulations, and arbitrarily and capriciously failed to calculate the dangers posed to local aviation. The FAA claimed that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the FAA's determinations and that their merits claims were faulty. The court found that petitioners had standing and that the FAA misread its regulations, leaving the challenged determinations inadequately justified. Accordingly, the petitions for review were granted and the FAA's determinations were vacated and remanded. View "Town of Barnstable, MA v. Federal Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

Victor Bravo Aviation is a Connecticut company founded and established by E. Brian Cleary and his wife Vicki in 2002. In 2004, Victor Bravo contracted to purchase an aircraft from Columbia Aircraft Sales in Connecticut. The aircraft was constructed in France. It was flown to the USA with scheduled stops in Maine and Connecticut in 2005. Victor Bravo took possession of the aircraft in Connecticut as its owner. The aircraft was flown its first twelve months in Maine and other surrounding states. The aircraft made thirty-seven flights to Maine. It was stationary in Maine for 156 days with approximately 121 overnight lay-overs. Victor Bravo never had the aircraft registered in Maine. Victor Bravo was assessed with Maine use taxes on the aircraft in February 2007. Victor Bravo appealed this assessment to the Superior Court which was upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court made the distinction between the facts of this case with those in the "Blue Yonder" case which was decided April 26, 2011. It was determined that the aircraft owned by Victor Bravo was used in a manner that went beyond having a “temporary, transient presence” in Maine. The Court held that under these circumstances, the aircraft should be properly considered to have “come to rest” in Maine, and therefore subject to the Maine use tax. The Court affirmed the Superior Court and Assessor’s decisions.View "Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Airlines, users of airports owned by the City of Chicago, have use agreements that make they city responsible for runway clearing. The airlines pay a per-landing fee, based on the city's actual expenses. In 1999 and 2000 the airports were crippled by severe snowstorms. The city obtained $6,000,000 in reimbursement from FEMA under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121. Years later FEMA ordered the city to return the money, based on a provision of the Act concerning duplicate benefits. FEMA asserted that the use agreements entitled the city to reimbursement of costs from the airlines. After exhausting administrative remedies the city filed suit. The district court denied the airlines' motion to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Finding that the airlines have standing, the court stated that t would not be as "efficient to litigate this three-cornered dispute in two lawsuits rather than one." View "City of Chicago v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law