Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

BeavEx is a same-day delivery service that uses 104 couriers to carry out its customers’ orders throughout Illinois. By classifying its couriers as independent contractors instead of employees, Beav-Ex attempted to avoid the requirements of state and federal employment laws, including the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115, which prohibits an employer from taking unauthorized deductions from its employees’ wages. Plaintiffs, and the putative class, were or are couriers who allege that they should have been classified as employees of BeavEx for purposes of the IWPCA, and that any deductions taken from their wages were illegal. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts any state law that is “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt the IWPCA and denied BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment. The court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class but granted their motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs are employees under the IWPCA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceeding View "Costello v. BeavEx, Inc." on Justia Law

Flytenow developed a web-based service through which private pilots can offer their planned itineraries to passengers willing to share the pilots’ expenses. The FAA issued a Letter of Interpretation, concluding that pilots offering flight-sharing services on Flytenow’s website would be operating as “common carriers,” which would require them to have commercial pilot licenses. Flytenow’s members, licensed only as private pilots, thus would violate FAA regulations if they offered their services via Flytenow.com. The court concluded that the FAA's Interpretation is consistent with the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and does not violate Flytenow’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Korean Air claiming that the airline’s failure to place her in the wheelchair that she requested when she booked her flight was an “accident” under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The Warsaw Convention sets forth air carrier liability for a passenger’s injuries if the accident causing the injury took place on board the aircraft, or during the process of embarking or disembarking. The court concluded that the district court was correct in holding that plaintiff’s injuries were not the result of an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention because her failure to be placed in a wheelchair was not an “unexpected or unusual” event. In this case, it would not have been “unexpected or unusual” for Korean Air employees to assume plaintiff simply did not want a wheelchair, and to refrain from tracking her down in the airport to provide her with the same empty wheelchair she just walked past. Because plaintiff did not suffer an “accident” under Article 17, the court need not determine whether the failure to place plaintiff in a wheelchair was a “link in the chain” of causes leading to her injuries. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Nguyen v. Korean Air Lines Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a pilot, filed a complaint alleging that Potomac Highlands Airport Authority (“PHAA”) wrongfully banned him from the Greater Cumberland Regional Airport. Petitioner’s complaint alleged a loss of income as a result of his inability to access the airport premises and sought injunctive relief. The circuit court granted PHAA’s motion to dismiss pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint, holding that Petitioner failed sufficiently to identify and plead the legal basis of his cause of action and failed adequately to state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). View "Malone v. Potomac Highlands Airport Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against a group of airlines and security contractors seeking to recover losses after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs alleged that, because defendants were negligent in overseeing airport security systems, the terrorists were able to hijack American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 and to fly those planes into the Twin Towers. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation only for the amount of value that their leasehold interests lost due to the terrorist attacks, that they cannot recover their claimed consequential damages, and that, pursuant to CPLR 4545, their insurance recoveries correspond to, and offset, their potential tort award. The court also agreed that United had no duty to supervise the security checkpoints or detect the hijackers who boarded American Airlines Flight 11. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by using an incorrect methodology when calculating the value by which plaintiffs’ leasehold interests declined, and the district court wrongly decided that prejudgment interest accrues at the federal funds rate on the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ leasehold estates. The district court should have calculated prejudgment interest using New York’s statutory prejudgment interest rate, and assessed that interest based on the final damages award. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Trade Center Properties LLC v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the California False Claims Act, Gov. Code, 12650 et seq., alleging that DHL overcharged and fraudulently billed the State for delivery services. The trial court concluded that the action was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), and Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The trial court then granted judgment on the pleadings. After remand from the California Supreme Court, the court concluded that People ex rel. Harris v. PAC Anchor Transportation, Inc. does not apply in this case. The court held, as it had before, that the application of the State Act in this case would constitute an impermissible regulation of DHL’s prices, routes and services in conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Grupp v. DHL Express" on Justia Law

In 2010, Southwest Airlines stopped honoring certain in-flight drink vouchers issued to customers who had bought “Business Select” fares. Customers filed suit, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement to provide replacement drink vouchers to all class members, and injunctive relief constraining how Southwest could issue future vouchers. The parties negotiated an agreement on fees for class counsel. The court certified the class and approved the settlement’s class relief components, but awarded counsel a smaller fee than requested. Two class members objected, arguing that the settlement was unfair to the class because it was too generous to class counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The “coupon settlement” provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712, allowed the court to award attorney fees based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed coupons. While the fee aspects of the settlement include troublesome features, the settlement provides class members essentially complete relief. The financial and professional relationship between lead class counsel and one lead plaintiff created a potential conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, but another lead plaintiff had no conflict and the class received essentially complete relief, so there was no basis for decertification or rejecting the settlement. The court instead removed that plaintiff’s $15,000 incentive award and reduced the lawyer’s fee. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

CTTA filed suit challenging Articles 30 and 30.1 of the San Francisco Police Code (the “Permit Scheme”), which comprehensively regulate the towing industry within the city and provide a number of conditions and requirements concerning the towing permits. CTTA claimed that the Permit Scheme was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501. On remand, the district court upheld nearly all of the Permit Scheme. The court concluded that the FAAAA’s safety exception does not, as CTTA contends, limit the set of valid safety rationales in this context to those concerned only with the safe physical operation of the tow trucks themselves; the permit requirements of sections 3000 and 3050 are “genuinely responsive” to the set of real safety concerns that underlay enactment of the Permit Scheme, fall within the Act’s safety exception, and are exempted from preemption; the application requirements, including the criminal history disclosure requirements, fall within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)(A), and are therefore not preempted; the fee and penalty provisions fall under the safety exception and are not preempted; the possession and display requirements are not preempted; the business plan requirement is preempted by the FAAAA, but the requirement is severable from the valid complaint requirement contained in section 3052(4), and from the Permit Scheme more generally; and the recordkeeping and brochure requirements fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, and are therefore saved from preemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "CTTA v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2005, a commuter aircraft, operated by Transair, crashed into terrain on its way to the Lockhart River airfield in Queensland, Australia. All 15 people on board died. The estates sued several companies and one individual, alleging that they contributed to the crash. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals in the case against the successor to the plane’s manufacturer and the case against the manufacturer of the plane’s warning system and maker of navigational charts. In both, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The successor had no duty to warn the plane’s operator of the need to install a more enhanced warning system, and the operator did not rely on any alleged voluntary undertaking of a duty to warn. The plaintiffs did not properly present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants’ products probably contributed to the crash, and the warning system’s manufacturer had no duty to alert the customer that an improved system should be installed. View "Thornton v. M7 Aerospace, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JetBlue and its former employee, alleging federal and state law claims. Plaintiff's claims arose out of an encounter at JFK airport in which plaintiff was reported for making an alleged bomb threat and was then arrested by the FBI. Plaintiff had arrived at the gate after the boarding door was closed but her checked luggage was already on board. Unhappy with the situation, plaintiff made statements, or raised questions, about the possibility of a bomb in her luggage. The court agreed with the district court that defendants are immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. 44941. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baez v. JetBlue Airways Corp." on Justia Law