Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

Jody Ducote co-piloted a passenger-carrying flight round-trip between the United States and the Bahamas but he was not qualified to pilot or co-pilot the flight. Ducote admitted both that he improperly piloted the Bahamas flights and that there was a material discrepancy between his personal flight log and the one he gave to the FAA. The FAA issued an emergency order revoking Ducote's pilot license, but the NTSB dismissed the Administration's complaint for failure to plead with sufficient factual specificity the seriousness of the violations. The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation and application of its stale complaint rule to dismiss Count 4 of the Administrator’s complaint marks an unexplained departure from prior precedent that is unsustainable under the plain text of the Board’s regulation; the Board relied on a finding never made by the ALJ to dismiss Count 3, rendering its reasoning entirely bankrupt; and therefore, the court vacated those portions of the Board’s decision, and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court granted the Administrator’s petition for review. View "Huerta v. Ducote" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation Airport Division (DOT-A), which leases Dillingham Airfield on the island of O’ahu from the United States Army, imposed landing fees on commercial users, including Petitioners. In 2012, DOT-A asserted that Petitioners owed DOT-A $264,995 in unpaid landing fees. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking the following relief: the return of landing fees paid under protest; injunctive relief preventing DOT-A from imposing additional fees against Petitioners; and a declaration that an administrative rule of DOT-A was invalid to the extent it established the rate of landing fees at the airfield. The circuit court denied injunctive relief and entered judgment on the merits in favor of DOT-A. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DOT-A is not precluded from setting and imposing landing fees at the airfield through a DOT-A procedure that references the Hawaii Administrative Rules for the landing fee rates. View "Pofolk Aviation Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. for State of Haw." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over an integrated seniority list of pilots after US Airways merged with America West Airlines. East Pilots and West Pilots were both represented by the ALPA where East Pilots advocated a list based on date of hire, while West Pilots advocated a list based on the strength of their pre-merger airline. After an unfavorable arbitration result, the East Pilots forced the decertification of ALPA and the creation of a new union, the USAPA. USAPA was expressly opposed to the enforcement of the arbitrator's award and openly committed to a seniority list based on date of hire. At issue on appeal is whether USAPA violated its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots. The court first determined that the case was ripe for review. On the merits, the court concluded that USAPA breached its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots where USAPA’s manifest disregard for the interests of the West Pilots and its discriminatory conduct towards them constitutes a clear breach of duty. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass'n" on Justia Law

The NTSB completed an investigation and issued reports identifying Georgina Joshi, the pilot, as the most likely cause of a plane crash. Georgina's father filed a petition seeking reconsideration of its conclusion in light of new evidence he gathered. The Board denied the petition. The court reported that it may not review the reports or the denial of the petition for reconsideration because they are not considered a final order subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joshi v. NTSB" on Justia Law

This suit arose after American Airlines began charging passengers $2 per bag to use curbside check-in services. A class of skycaps - airport porters who assist passengers with curbside check-in - working at airports throughout the country sued American Airlines. Plaintiffs alleged that American failed adequately to notify customers that skycaps would not receive the proceeds from the new charge and that the compensation decreased significantly following the introduction of the new charge. On behalf of the Massachusetts skycaps, Plaintiff sued for violations of the Massachusetts Tips Law. Plaintiffs also sued on behalf of the class for tortious interference with a contract and unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the federal Airline Deregulation Act preempted each of the skycaps’ claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that federal law preempted the skycaps’ state statutory and common law claims. View "Overka v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

AFA petitioned for review of the FAA's Notice N8900.240, which is an internal guidance document issued to FAA aviation safety inspectors concerning the use and stowage of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other aircraft. AFA seeks to invoke the court's jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), but the FAA claims that this court lacks jurisdiction because the Notice does not constitute final agency action. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider AFA's challenge because the disputed Notice does not reflect final action by the FAA where it does not determine any rights or obligations, or produce legal consequences. The Notice does not purport to amend any FAA regulation and it does not otherwise carry the force of law. View "Assoc. of Flight Attendants v. Huerta" on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

The 2002 Homeland Security Act provides that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosur[e] would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). TSA promulgated regulations prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of “sensitive security information,” including “[s]pecific details of aviation security measures.” 49 CFR 1520.7(j). In 2003, TSA briefed all air marshals, including MacLean, about a potential plot to hijack passenger flights. A few days later, MacLean received from TSA a text message temporarily cancelling all overnight missions from Las Vegas. MacLean, who was stationed in Las Vegas, believed that cancelling those missions during a hijacking alert was dangerous and illegal; he told a reporter about the decision. TSA fired him. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected claims that his disclosure was whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A), which protects employees who disclose information that reveals “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” or “a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety” unless disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. MacLean’s disclosure was not specifically prohibited by law because regulations do not qualify as “law” under the whistleblower statute. Interpreting the word “law” to include rules and regulations could defeat the purpose of the statute, allowing an agency to insulate itself simply by promulgating a regulation that “specifically prohibited” all whistleblowing. MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by Section 114(r)(1). That statute does not prohibit anything, but only authorizes TSA to “prescribe regulations.” View "Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean" on Justia Law

The 2002 Homeland Security Act provides that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosur[e] would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). TSA promulgated regulations prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of “sensitive security information,” including “[s]pecific details of aviation security measures.” 49 CFR 1520.7(j). In 2003, TSA briefed all air marshals, including MacLean, about a potential plot to hijack passenger flights. A few days later, MacLean received from TSA a text message temporarily cancelling all overnight missions from Las Vegas. MacLean, who was stationed in Las Vegas, believed that cancelling those missions during a hijacking alert was dangerous and illegal; he told a reporter about the decision. TSA fired him. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected claims that his disclosure was whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A), which protects employees who disclose information that reveals “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” or “a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety” unless disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. MacLean’s disclosure was not specifically prohibited by law because regulations do not qualify as “law” under the whistleblower statute. Interpreting the word “law” to include rules and regulations could defeat the purpose of the statute, allowing an agency to insulate itself simply by promulgating a regulation that “specifically prohibited” all whistleblowing. MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by Section 114(r)(1). That statute does not prohibit anything, but only authorizes TSA to “prescribe regulations.” View "Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean" on Justia Law