Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Southwest Airlines stopped honoring certain in-flight drink vouchers issued to customers who had bought “Business Select” fares. Customers filed suit, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement to provide replacement drink vouchers to all class members, and injunctive relief constraining how Southwest could issue future vouchers. The parties negotiated an agreement on fees for class counsel. The court certified the class and approved the settlement’s class relief components, but awarded counsel a smaller fee than requested. Two class members objected, arguing that the settlement was unfair to the class because it was too generous to class counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The “coupon settlement” provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712, allowed the court to award attorney fees based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed coupons. While the fee aspects of the settlement include troublesome features, the settlement provides class members essentially complete relief. The financial and professional relationship between lead class counsel and one lead plaintiff created a potential conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, but another lead plaintiff had no conflict and the class received essentially complete relief, so there was no basis for decertification or rejecting the settlement. The court instead removed that plaintiff’s $15,000 incentive award and reduced the lawyer’s fee. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

CTTA filed suit challenging Articles 30 and 30.1 of the San Francisco Police Code (the “Permit Scheme”), which comprehensively regulate the towing industry within the city and provide a number of conditions and requirements concerning the towing permits. CTTA claimed that the Permit Scheme was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501. On remand, the district court upheld nearly all of the Permit Scheme. The court concluded that the FAAAA’s safety exception does not, as CTTA contends, limit the set of valid safety rationales in this context to those concerned only with the safe physical operation of the tow trucks themselves; the permit requirements of sections 3000 and 3050 are “genuinely responsive” to the set of real safety concerns that underlay enactment of the Permit Scheme, fall within the Act’s safety exception, and are exempted from preemption; the application requirements, including the criminal history disclosure requirements, fall within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)(A), and are therefore not preempted; the fee and penalty provisions fall under the safety exception and are not preempted; the possession and display requirements are not preempted; the business plan requirement is preempted by the FAAAA, but the requirement is severable from the valid complaint requirement contained in section 3052(4), and from the Permit Scheme more generally; and the recordkeeping and brochure requirements fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, and are therefore saved from preemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "CTTA v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2005, a commuter aircraft, operated by Transair, crashed into terrain on its way to the Lockhart River airfield in Queensland, Australia. All 15 people on board died. The estates sued several companies and one individual, alleging that they contributed to the crash. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals in the case against the successor to the plane’s manufacturer and the case against the manufacturer of the plane’s warning system and maker of navigational charts. In both, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The successor had no duty to warn the plane’s operator of the need to install a more enhanced warning system, and the operator did not rely on any alleged voluntary undertaking of a duty to warn. The plaintiffs did not properly present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants’ products probably contributed to the crash, and the warning system’s manufacturer had no duty to alert the customer that an improved system should be installed. View "Thornton v. M7 Aerospace, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JetBlue and its former employee, alleging federal and state law claims. Plaintiff's claims arose out of an encounter at JFK airport in which plaintiff was reported for making an alleged bomb threat and was then arrested by the FBI. Plaintiff had arrived at the gate after the boarding door was closed but her checked luggage was already on board. Unhappy with the situation, plaintiff made statements, or raised questions, about the possibility of a bomb in her luggage. The court agreed with the district court that defendants are immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. 44941. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baez v. JetBlue Airways Corp." on Justia Law

Jody Ducote co-piloted a passenger-carrying flight round-trip between the United States and the Bahamas but he was not qualified to pilot or co-pilot the flight. Ducote admitted both that he improperly piloted the Bahamas flights and that there was a material discrepancy between his personal flight log and the one he gave to the FAA. The FAA issued an emergency order revoking Ducote's pilot license, but the NTSB dismissed the Administration's complaint for failure to plead with sufficient factual specificity the seriousness of the violations. The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation and application of its stale complaint rule to dismiss Count 4 of the Administrator’s complaint marks an unexplained departure from prior precedent that is unsustainable under the plain text of the Board’s regulation; the Board relied on a finding never made by the ALJ to dismiss Count 3, rendering its reasoning entirely bankrupt; and therefore, the court vacated those portions of the Board’s decision, and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court granted the Administrator’s petition for review. View "Huerta v. Ducote" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation Airport Division (DOT-A), which leases Dillingham Airfield on the island of O’ahu from the United States Army, imposed landing fees on commercial users, including Petitioners. In 2012, DOT-A asserted that Petitioners owed DOT-A $264,995 in unpaid landing fees. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking the following relief: the return of landing fees paid under protest; injunctive relief preventing DOT-A from imposing additional fees against Petitioners; and a declaration that an administrative rule of DOT-A was invalid to the extent it established the rate of landing fees at the airfield. The circuit court denied injunctive relief and entered judgment on the merits in favor of DOT-A. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DOT-A is not precluded from setting and imposing landing fees at the airfield through a DOT-A procedure that references the Hawaii Administrative Rules for the landing fee rates. View "Pofolk Aviation Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. for State of Haw." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over an integrated seniority list of pilots after US Airways merged with America West Airlines. East Pilots and West Pilots were both represented by the ALPA where East Pilots advocated a list based on date of hire, while West Pilots advocated a list based on the strength of their pre-merger airline. After an unfavorable arbitration result, the East Pilots forced the decertification of ALPA and the creation of a new union, the USAPA. USAPA was expressly opposed to the enforcement of the arbitrator's award and openly committed to a seniority list based on date of hire. At issue on appeal is whether USAPA violated its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots. The court first determined that the case was ripe for review. On the merits, the court concluded that USAPA breached its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots where USAPA’s manifest disregard for the interests of the West Pilots and its discriminatory conduct towards them constitutes a clear breach of duty. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass'n" on Justia Law

The NTSB completed an investigation and issued reports identifying Georgina Joshi, the pilot, as the most likely cause of a plane crash. Georgina's father filed a petition seeking reconsideration of its conclusion in light of new evidence he gathered. The Board denied the petition. The court reported that it may not review the reports or the denial of the petition for reconsideration because they are not considered a final order subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joshi v. NTSB" on Justia Law

This suit arose after American Airlines began charging passengers $2 per bag to use curbside check-in services. A class of skycaps - airport porters who assist passengers with curbside check-in - working at airports throughout the country sued American Airlines. Plaintiffs alleged that American failed adequately to notify customers that skycaps would not receive the proceeds from the new charge and that the compensation decreased significantly following the introduction of the new charge. On behalf of the Massachusetts skycaps, Plaintiff sued for violations of the Massachusetts Tips Law. Plaintiffs also sued on behalf of the class for tortious interference with a contract and unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the federal Airline Deregulation Act preempted each of the skycaps’ claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that federal law preempted the skycaps’ state statutory and common law claims. View "Overka v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

AFA petitioned for review of the FAA's Notice N8900.240, which is an internal guidance document issued to FAA aviation safety inspectors concerning the use and stowage of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other aircraft. AFA seeks to invoke the court's jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), but the FAA claims that this court lacks jurisdiction because the Notice does not constitute final agency action. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider AFA's challenge because the disputed Notice does not reflect final action by the FAA where it does not determine any rights or obligations, or produce legal consequences. The Notice does not purport to amend any FAA regulation and it does not otherwise carry the force of law. View "Assoc. of Flight Attendants v. Huerta" on Justia Law