Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that Spirit conducted an enterprise by means of racketeering activity. The district court dismissed the action. The court concluded that, because federal laws do not preempt other federal laws, subsequent legislation could preclude plaintiffs' claims only if Congress had repealed the provision of RICO, at least insofar as they authorized plaintiffs' actions; Congress did not do so expressly through the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; there was no "repeal by implication" because Congress has not exhibited the requisite clear and manifest intent; and a saving clause found in the ADA did not disturb any other remedies provided by law. The court concluded that the two laws are not irreconcilably in conflict, nor was the ADA clearly intended as a substitute for RICO. The court, applying the strong presumption against implied repeals, was strongly constrained to conclude that RICO supplements, rather than subverts, federal regulation of air carriers. The court also held that the federal regulatory scheme governing the airline industry does not preclude a claim founded on the civil provisions of RICO. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Ray, et al. v. Spirit Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, motor carriers, alleging that defendants routinely violate California's meal and rest break laws, Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512; Cal. Code Regs. tit.8, 11090. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. The court concluded that the Act does not preempt California's meal and rest break laws as applied to defendants because those laws are not related to defendants' prices, routes, or services. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Air Jamaica and Caribbean Airlines, seeking recovery under Article 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350, a multilateral treaty setting rules for international air travel. Article 17 addresses accidents that injure passengers on board a plane or during the course of embarkation or disembarkation, and Article 19 concerns damages due to delay. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that Article 33 granted the district court power to hear plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on alternative grounds to the extent that plaintiff failed to state claims against defendants. The court vacated the dismissal of the Article 19 claim against Air Jamaica for damages from the $150 fee to change flights, and remanded only as to that issue. View "Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the FAA's revocation of his Designated Pilot Examiner appointment based on deficiencies in his performance. Petitioner argued that the FAA failed to follow its own procedures and that one of his FAA evaluators labored under a conflict of interest. The court concluded that plaintiff's termination letter substantially complied with an FAA order and, moreover, plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged deficiencies in the specificity of his termination letter. Further, plaintiff failed to show that any improper conflict of interest affected the decision to terminate his appointment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sheble, III v. Huerta, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated petitions concerned proposed alternatives to security procedures mandated by the TSA. Amerijet requested alternative cargo screening procedures at various foreign airports it services and the TSA largely denied these requests. Amerijet petitioned for review, arguing that TSA's denials failed for want of reasoned decisionmaking and that TSA's actions violated Amerijet's right to equal protection of the law. The court concluded that, even under a highly deferential standard of review, TSA's denials were arbitrary and capricious as to most of Amerijet's requests where TSA failed to adequately explain most of its denials. Because the court had no meaningful basis to evaluate TSA's decisionmaking, the court remanded, excluding two issues. Accordingly, Amerijet's equal protection claim is unripe and the court dismissed the claim without prejudice. View "Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Pistole" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JAL, alleging that JAL retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns and constructively terminated him for reasons related to his medical and mental fitness. At issue on appeal was whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 49 U.S.C. 40103 et seq., preempted plaintiff's state law claims. The court concluded that the FAA and accompanying regulations preempted plaintiff's retaliation and constructive termination claims. The court held that federal law preempted state law claims that encroached upon, supplemented, or altered the federally occupied field of aviation safety and presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's legislative goal to create a single, uniform, system of regulating that field. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration where he conceded that the conduct giving rise to his claims occurred in U.S. airspace. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of JAL. View "Ventress v. Japan Airlines" on Justia Law

GoJet petitioned for review of the FAA Acting Administrator's ruling that GoJet violated FAA regulations when it failed to make a logbook entry and to remove a gear pin. GoJet argued that it did not violate 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a) and 121.153(a)(2) by carelessly or recklessly operating an unairworthy airplane, and procedural error. The court concluded that the Administrator did not err in determining that GoJet violated section 121.153(a)(2) where the type-certificate nonconformity in this case - inoperable landing gear - was so clearly related to safe operation of the airplane that a finding that the airplane was not airworthy was clearly warranted based solely on this nonconformity. The court also concluded that the Administrator did not err in crediting an FAA Inspector's testimony regarding potential danger and finding that GoJet violated section 91.13(a). The Administrator's decision that GoJet failed to establish extraordinary circumstances was not arbitrary or capricious. A violation of section 91.13(a) did not require proof of actual danger to lives or property; the potential for danger was enough. Finally, the agency did not abuse its discretion in terminating the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program self-disclosure proceeding and commencing a civil penalty action. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "GoJet Airlines v. FAA" on Justia Law

Lilliputian, manufacturer of micro fuel cells powered by butane, challenged the prohibition in a final rule against airline passengers and crew carrying butane fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage. Lilliputian argued that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious in light of the dissimilar treatment of other products that were not subject to the rigorous safety specifications imposed on fuel cell cartridges. The court concluded that the Safety Administration failed to provide the required "reasoned explanation and substantial evidence" for the disparate treatment. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Safety Administration to provide further explanation for the prohibition, including its response to Lilliputian's comments. View "Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin." on Justia Law