Justia Aviation Opinion Summaries

Trans State Airlines, LLC ("TSA") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Air Line Pilots Association International ("ALPA") enforcing an arbitrator's award of backpay to a pilot after TSA fired him. At issue was whether the award violated public policy against large loans to union officials embodied in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 401-531. After concluding that TSA had standing to pursue an appeal and that the arbitrator's unreviewed decision in a prior arbitration did not preclude TSA's public policy challenge, the court held that the lack of control, combined with the purpose and structure of the section 60 payments in ALPA's Administrative Manual, weighed against finding the payments were an illegal loan.View "Air Line Pilots Association v. Trans States Airlines, LLC" on Justia Law

Victor Bravo Aviation is a Connecticut company founded and established by E. Brian Cleary and his wife Vicki in 2002. In 2004, Victor Bravo contracted to purchase an aircraft from Columbia Aircraft Sales in Connecticut. The aircraft was constructed in France. It was flown to the USA with scheduled stops in Maine and Connecticut in 2005. Victor Bravo took possession of the aircraft in Connecticut as its owner. The aircraft was flown its first twelve months in Maine and other surrounding states. The aircraft made thirty-seven flights to Maine. It was stationary in Maine for 156 days with approximately 121 overnight lay-overs. Victor Bravo never had the aircraft registered in Maine. Victor Bravo was assessed with Maine use taxes on the aircraft in February 2007. Victor Bravo appealed this assessment to the Superior Court which was upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court made the distinction between the facts of this case with those in the "Blue Yonder" case which was decided April 26, 2011. It was determined that the aircraft owned by Victor Bravo was used in a manner that went beyond having a “temporary, transient presence” in Maine. The Court held that under these circumstances, the aircraft should be properly considered to have “come to rest” in Maine, and therefore subject to the Maine use tax. The Court affirmed the Superior Court and Assessor’s decisions.View "Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Airlines, users of airports owned by the City of Chicago, have use agreements that make they city responsible for runway clearing. The airlines pay a per-landing fee, based on the city's actual expenses. In 1999 and 2000 the airports were crippled by severe snowstorms. The city obtained $6,000,000 in reimbursement from FEMA under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121. Years later FEMA ordered the city to return the money, based on a provision of the Act concerning duplicate benefits. FEMA asserted that the use agreements entitled the city to reimbursement of costs from the airlines. After exhausting administrative remedies the city filed suit. The district court denied the airlines' motion to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Finding that the airlines have standing, the court stated that t would not be as "efficient to litigate this three-cornered dispute in two lawsuits rather than one." View "City of Chicago v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, on a plea of guilty, of serving as an airman without an airman's certificate. Defendant appealed from his sentence on the ground that the district court procedurally erred by sentencing him pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A5.2 rather than U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. The court held that, by relying on defendant's uncharged relevant conduct in selecting the applicable guidelines, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's guidelines range. In doing so, the district court committed procedural error in sentencing him and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct guideline. View "United States v. McEnry" on Justia Law

The City Council of Tulsa decided to encourage the initiation of new direct nonstop airline service to business centers on the East and West coasts, and voted to approve a Memorandum between the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City which would convey certain real property (Property) for that purpose. The transfer would allow TIA to mortgage the Property to the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in support of a non-recourse loan so that TIA could, in turn, make an aggregate loan (Great Plains Loan) to Great Plains Airlines, Inc. (Great Plains). This transfer would allow the Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) to enter into a Support Agreement, pursuant to which TIA, in the event of a default would have the option of selling the Property to TAIT under the direction of the BOK. Upon exercise of such option, the TIA would sell, transfer and convey the property to TAIT to satisfy the outstanding loan balance. Great Plains subsequently defaulted under the terms of the Great Plains Loan, and left a balance owed to the Bank. Ultimately TAIT did not purchase the Property. TIA and the Bank sued TAIT. TAIT alleged the Support Agreement was unlawful and an unenforceable contract because TAIT could not purchase the Great Plains Loan and Property by reason that all of TAIT's funds were airport revenues and such purchases would violate the FAA Revenue Use Policy. To resolve the matter, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement which provided the City would pay BOK. The City and its Mayor asked the trial court to determine that the settlement agreement was a lawful contract executed by the City, and the settlement payment made pursuant to the settlement agreement was a lawful expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers intervened, and asked the trial court to determine that the payment of money to the Bank of Oklahoma pursuant to the settlement agreement was an illegal transfer of public funds made pursuant to an unlawful settlement agreement. In granting the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the settlement agreement was a lawful and the settlement payment was a lawful expenditure of funds. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded the settlement was not based on a contract, but rather under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment to the City of Tulsa, and as such, the City had authority to enter into the Settlement Agreement. However, the Court found that the unjust enrichment claim was unviable and the Statute of Limitations would have barred the unjust enrichment claim against the City. The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to direct the repayment of the settlement funds from BOK back to the City of Tulsa. View "City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A." on Justia Law

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Trucking Ass'n v. The City of Los Angeles, et al." on Justia Law

The owners bought property in 1995 and live there with their daughter. It is under the flight paths of runways of the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. In 2002, the owners filed a class-action mandamus action, seeking to compel the city to initiate appropriation proceedings, claiming that the level and frequency of flights so interfered with their use and enjoyment that the property had been taken for public use without just compensation. The state court dismissed. They tried again in 2008, citing expansion projects. The city removed the case to federal district court, which dismissed with prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The district court erred in applying res judicata; the claims based upon the 2004 and 2007 expansions could not have been raised in the 2002 Action and are premised on a new transaction or occurrence distinct from the subject matter of the 2002 Action. View "Boggs v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate. View "Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Transp." on Justia Law

Thomas E. Clemmons, the former director of operations for Ameristar Airways, Incorporated (Ameristar), filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting air safety issues to the Federal Aviation Administration. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (Board) found a violation of the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, ordering an award of back pay. The court held that because Clemmons had presented a prima facie case of retaliation and adduced evidence capable of rebutting Ameristar's proffered explanations, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of liability. The court held, however, that because the question of whether Clemmons' insubordinate email, which was after-acquired evidence, "was of such severity that [he] would have been terminated on these grounds alone" was a question of fact, the court remanded to the agency to make that determination and to adjust the back pay award if necessary. View "Ameristar Airways, Inc., et al. v. Administrative Review Board" on Justia Law

The insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that a plane crash that killed five people did not trigger coverage under a fleet insurance policy issued to an aircraft maintenance and charter company. The policy identifies the company's clients (including Wyndham) as "named insureds" and as "insured owners," but Wyndham did not participate in its negotiation. Wyndham filed a counterclaim seeking coverage. The crash involved a plane rented by a Wyndham employee to attend a work-related meeting, but did not involve the charter company in any way. The court held that Wyndham was entitled to coverage. The Third Circuit reversed. New Jersey law allows reformation, on the basis of mutual mistake, against a party that did not participate in negotiation of a contract and the insurance company sufficiently pled mutual mistake. Although the contract appears to provide third parties with coverage when using aircraft without the charter company's involvement, both contracting parties believed that the language did not expand coverage to entities unaffiliated with the charter company, such as Wyndham. The premium went down with the addition of the language at issue because the intent was to limit coverage for to aircraft owned, used by, or at the direction of the charter company. View "IL Nat'l Ins. Co v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc." on Justia Law